Re: Curious: syncookies ready for distributed syn flooding?

From: Alan Cox (alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk)
Date: Sat Jun 10 2000 - 17:09:01 EDT

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    > My understanding of the syncookies implementation (in 2.0, at least) is
    > that it only protects the host which is using it; not the hosts _behind_ it
    > (ie. acting as a firewall). Is this not the case?

    It depends if you configure your firewall as a proxy host

    > 1.) The firewall maintains a "Max SYN's per port per sec" value,
    > configurable in some way.

    Instant DoS attack using the firewall

    > 4.) When a SYN arrives, it is compared to the value in the temp hash table:
    > if there is not an entry, one is added (as above). If there is an entry,
    > and it hasn't been validated, a validation request is sent. If there is an
    > entry and it has already been validated, any more SYN's from this host will
    > be accepted right away.**

    So I attack your hash function

    I'd actually be tempted to implement syn cookies on the firewall and do a
    proxy session, even if I did it purely kernel space.

    Alan

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